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It is generally agreed that local government 
has been the weakest of the three main tiers 
of government in Papua New Guinea since it 
gained independence in 1975. The reasons for 
this have been documented in the literature on 
the decentralisation that was brought into effect 
by the Organic Law on Provincial Government 
1977 (Ghai and Regan 1993; Peasah 1994; May 
and Regan 1997; May 1999). Although this law 
gave provincial governments the power to create 
forms of local government more appropriate 
to local social circumstances than the model 
previously advocated by the Australian colonial 
administration, few took advantage of this 
opportunity. Whatever the standing of individual 
councillors within their own communities, the 
councils themselves generally lacked the financial 
and human resources required for them to function 
effectively as organisations engaged in the delivery 
of public goods and services. This problem is still 
apparent in most parts of the country.
I do not propose to discuss here what could 
have been done, or should now be done, to 
improve the performance of this third level 
of government. Instead, I wish to discuss an 
institutional arrangement, known as a Special 
Purposes Authority (SPA), which has been 
used to perform some of the functions of local 
government in specific local circumstances. 
My interest in this subject arose from my recent 
experience as a consultant engaged in the 
production of a sustainable development policy 
for the mining sector that would seek to improve 
the management of project benefits disbursed to 
local communities and mine-affected areas (PNG 
Department of Mining 2003). While one of my 
aims is to document the potential significance 
of SPAs for this particular policy framework, I 
also wish to consider the broader question of 
how such exceptional institutional arrangements 
might be an instrument of national policy outside 
of the mining sector.
THE LEGACY OF THE NEW 
ORGANIC LAW
The Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local-Level Governments 1995 established a 
whole new set of relationships between the three 
levels of government in PNG. In setting a new 
standard for the way in which these relationships 
ought to be constructed, it also removed those 
elements of regional variation and local flexibility 
which had developed under the Organic Law 
of 1977. The new Organic Law removed the 
power of provincial governments to make 
laws about local government, it increased the 
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legislative powers of Local-Level Governments 
(LLGs) themselves, but it also placed their plans 
and budgets under the control of the national 
Members of Parliament (MPs) representing each 
open electorate.
Section 44 of the new Organic Law allows 
LLGs to make laws about: (a) labour and 
employment (but not industrial relations); 
(b) labour or community industries; (c) self-
help and tokples schools, but not curriculum; 
(d) cemeteries; (e) provision of water supply; 
(f) provision of electricity; (g) improvement 
of villages, towns, cities and communities; 
(h) maintaining peace, good order and law 
through consultation, mediation, arbitration 
and community forums; (i) dispute settlement; 
(j) town, city, village and community planning; 
(k) cottage industries; (l) social services; 
(m) bride and groom wealth; (n) general licensing; 
(o) community sport, recreation, cultural 
and industrial shows; (p) local environment; 
(q) local tourist facilities and services; 
(r) housing; (s) domestic animals, flora and fauna; 
(t) human settlements; (u) census and village 
or community records; (v) traditional barter 
system; (w) control on consumption and use of 
alcohol, betel nuts, and betel nut related products 
or any other marketable items; (x) hygiene 
and sanitation; (y) local trading (not mobile); 
(z) the protection of traditional sacred sites; 
(aa) community day work or service programmes; 
(ab) the imposition of fines for breaches of any of 
its laws; (ac) village communities; (ad) local aid 
posts and clinics; (ae) traditional and customary 
copyrights. However, these law-making powers 
have no organic connection with the planning 
and budgeting process that determines the 
allocation of financial resources. 
Section 33A of the new law establishes 
Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities 
Committees (JDPBPCs) which comprise: the MP 
representing the open electorate who shall be 
the chairman of the committee; the heads of 
LLGs in the district or their nominees; and up 
to three other members appointed by the MP in 
consultation with the heads of the LLGs. The 
functions of the JDPBPC are: to oversee, coordinate 
and make recommendations as to the overall 
district planning, including budget priorities, for 
consideration by the provincial and national 
governments; to determine and control the budget 
allocation priorities for the LLGs in the district; 
to approve the LLG budgets for presentation to 
the LLG and make recommendations concerning 
them; to draw up a rolling five-year development 
plan and annual estimates for the district; and to 
conduct annual reviews of the rolling five-year 
development plan.
Section 98 of the 1995 Organic Law, which 
is concerned with ‘benefits derived from natural 
resources’, appears to provide a way for LLGs to 
finance their operations outside of this planning 
and budgeting process. It says that the developer 
of a natural resource shall pay ‘development 
levies’ at its own expense to the Provincial 
Government(s) and LLG(s) of the province or 
area in which the development is situated, as well 
as ‘land owners benefits’ which are payable to 
all three levels of government for redistribution 
to the ‘owners of the land from which the 
natural resources were obtained’. It then goes 
on to say that the development levies ‘shall be 
controlled through a trust fund which shall be 
managed and administered in accordance with an 
Act of the Parliament’; that resource developers 
shall provide to all three levels of government 
‘expertise and professional support as to the use 
of the development levies’; and that other laws 
‘shall make provision for the rates, management, 
sharing arrangement, and application of the 
development levies’. If this part of the new law 
was intended to ruffle the feathers of extractive 
industry (Filer 1997), it also had the effect of 
creating a space in which policy makers were 
obliged to think of ways to incorporate these 
strange new forms of taxation into the laws 
regulating each industrial sector.
THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIAL 
PURPOSES AUTHORITIES
Those aspects of the new Organic Law 
which pertained to the operation of LLGs were 
brought into effect by the passage and gazettal 
of the Local-level Governments Administration Act 
1997.2 Section 38 of this act sets out the key 
administrative functions of LLGs as follows:
•  preparing corporate plans and estimates;
•  preparing a rolling five-year development 
plan taking into account rolling five year 
development plans for the wards as prepared by 
the elected ward members;
•  preparing an annual plan taking into 
account the rolling five-year development plan;
•  preparing annual budgets based on the 
annual plans;
•  keeping proper accounts and records of its 
transactions and affairs;
•  ensuring necessary arrangements and 
participation at forums on renewable natural 
resources;
•  constructing and maintaining infrastructure 
and facilities that are the responsibility of an 
LLG; and
  Horses for Courses
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•  maintain the Kairik airstrip;
•  receive and distribute royalties from the 
provincial government; 
•  administer the spending of monies under 
the mining company’s Community Facilities 
Grant;
•  advise on liquor licensing matters in 
Porgera District; and
•  assist the Provincial Town Planning Board 
in planning any township in Porgera District 
(Bonnell 1999: 76).
In 1994, the New Ireland Provincial 
Government passed a bill to transform the 
Nimamar Community Government into the 
Nimamar Development Authority in the context 
of negotiations to develop another large-scale 
gold mine on the island of Lihir.3 In this case, the 
constitution specified the functions as being to:
•  receive and disburse grants such as monies 
paid from the Special Support Grant associated 
with development of the mine;
•  organise, finance, engage in or assist any 
business or enterprise;
•  carry out any works;
•  provide or finance the provision of services 
and facilities for the benefit of people in the local 
area;
•  provide advice to the provincial and 
national governments on matters affecting local 
people;
•  encourage local participation in development 
programmes; and
•  act as an agent for other public bodies or 
institutions on agreed terms and conditions.
When the new Organic Law was passed in 
1995, bureaucrats in Port Moresby were inclined 
to think that it spelt the end of SPAs, primarily 
because it removed the power of provincial 
governments to legislate for the performance 
of local government functions.4 The Nimamar 
Development Authority was duly reconstituted 
as an LLG, even though local people continued 
to refer to it by its previous name. In Porgera, 
however, local people were so attached to the 
Porgera Development Authority as an entity 
discrete from the two local-level governments 
that they threatened to close down the mining 
operation if the national government saw fit to 
abolish it.
The potential value of this mechanism has 
since been recognised in the actual or proposed 
establishment of additional SPAs, including 
a proposal to reconstitute the Nimamar 
Development Authority as an entity distinct 
from the Nimamar LLG (Table 1). The most 
important advantages of this type of arrangement 
are to be found in the ‘arms-length’ relationship 
•  initiating and implementing programmes 
for youth and women.
Part VII of the Local-level Governments 
Administration Act allows the Head of State, 
acting on advice from the National Executive 
Council, and following a recommendation from 
the Minister for Inter-Governmental Affairs, 
to ‘establish a Local-level Government Special 
Purposes Authority in and for an area of one 
or more Local-level Governments’ to assist 
in the implementation of one or more local-
level government functions. The Minister’s 
recommendation is to specify the purpose, 
management, funding and staffing arrangements 
of the SPA, and does not necessarily require any 
consultation with the relevant LLGs. SPAs are 
corporate bodies whose powers are determined 
by their constitutions rather than the laws and 
regulations which normally govern the operations 
of government agencies. Section 45 of the Act 
says that the affairs of an SPA shall be conducted 
by a ‘managing body’ which is not to include the 
members of an LLG, and that its operations shall 
be ‘at arms length’ from an LLG. On the other 
hand, Section 48 says that the powers vested in 
an SPA should not have the effect of divesting an 
LLG of that same power.
The option to create an SPA had also 
existed under the previous Organic Law, and was 
apparently created by the Australian colonial 
administration under the Local Government 
(Authorities) Act 1970. Four such entities were 
already in existence in 1976: the Higaturu-Oro 
Bay Services Authority, the South Bougainville 
Roads Authority, the Finschhafen-Kabwum 
Planning and Development Authority, and the 
Southern Highlands Development Authority. The 
South Bougainville Roads Authority outlasted 
the dissolution of three local government councils 
which had originally agreed to its establishment 
because it was seen as ‘an important vehicle 
for local development’ in the context of the 
Panguna copper mine (Peasah 1994: 22). By 
1988, the Finschhafen-Kabwum Planning and 
Development Authority (in Morobe Province) 
was the only one of these four SPAs that was still 
operating (ibid.: 78).
In 1989, however, the Porgera Development 
Authority (PDA) was established under the 
agreements that led to development of the 
Porgera gold mine in Enga Province. The PDA’s 
constitution specified its functions as being to:
•  control, manage and administer the Porgera 
District;
•  ensure the welfare of its residents;
•  assist the local government councils in 
carrying out functions within the district;
  Horses for Courses
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with provincial and local-level governments, and 
in the capacity of SPAs to hire and fire personnel 
without reference to public service regulations. 
But there have also been some attempts (notably 
in the oil and gas sector) to use such bodies as 
‘fronts’ for the misappropriation of government 
funds. Before considering the circumstances in 
which this kind of arrangement might or might 
not be justified, I shall first provide an account of 
the way that the Porgera Development Authority 
has recently been functioning, because it is the 
prototype of an SPA functioning under the new 
Organic Law. 
THE PORGERA DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY
In 1998, the Porgera Development Authority 
(PDA) was officially transformed into the 
‘Porgera-Paiela Local-level Government Special 
Purposes Authority’, but the people of Porgera 
District have continued to refer to it by its former 
title, and I shall do the same. The Memorandum 
of Agreement which served to change the status 
of the PDA says that its functions are to:
•  implement the construction of infrastructure 
on behalf of the National Government, 
Provincial Government and LLGs within the 
Porgera District;
•  assist the Porgera and Paiela-Hewa LLGs 
in the implementation of their administrative 
functions;
•  manage the construction of facilities in 
Paiam, Porgera and Kairik towns and manage 
their operations;
•  manage the payment of royalties and other 
mine related income in the Porgera District;
•  manage and operate the Porgera District 
Hospital;
•  advise the landowners and the LLGs on 
natural resource project agreements;
•  implement the functions of the Tenders 
Board, Building Board, Physical planning Board 
and other functions delegated to it by the 
National Government, Provincial Government 
or LLGs; and
•  receive funds on behalf of the Porgera and 
Paiela-Hewa Rural LLGs and to make payments 
as directed by them.
The Board of the reconstituted PDA was to 
include two community members nominated by 
each of the two LLGs, two persons appointed 
by the customary owners of the Special Mining 
Lease, the Porgera District Administrator, one 
official from each of the national government 
departments responsible for finance and mining, 
a representative of the Porgera Joint Venture (the 
mining company), and two people appointed for 
their ‘technical skills’. By 2002, the number of 
landowner representatives had been increased 
from two to four.
The original mining development agreements 
provided for the PDA to receive and manage 
several revenue streams on behalf of what were 
then the two local government councils in the 
mine-affected area. Some additional revenues 
have since been derived from the introduction of 
the Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme in 1992.5 
Table 2 shows the actual and projected value of 
these revenue streams in 2002. Actual receipts 
are almost certainly understated because the early 
financial records of the PDA are unavailable or 
incomplete. In the four years from 1998 to 2001, 
the revenues of the PDA averaged more than K6 
million per annum.
The performance of the PDA was evaluated 
by consultants engaged in the production 
of a Sustainable Development Policy and a 
Sustainability Planning Framework for the 
Department of Mining in 2002. The PDA was 
found to be doing a better job of planning and 
managing the delivery of public infrastructure 
and services than other government institutions 
Table 2: Cash income of the Porgera Development Authority since 1989 (K million at 2001 values).
Income Type
Actual Receipts 
(1989-2001)
Forecast Receipts 
(2002-2011)
Total
Royalties  4  5  9
Dividends (Mineral Resources Enga)    0.3 10   10.3
Special Support Grant  5 16 21
Mining & Infrastructure Grants 11  0 11
Tax Credit Scheme  3  5  8
Infrastructure Grants from Porgera Joint Venture  5  0  5
Total   28.3 36   64.3
Source: Simpson (2002).
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in Enga Province, primarily because it was able to 
employ professional technical and administrative 
staff on better terms and conditions. However, 
interviews with senior management highlighted 
problems which show how difficult it is for an 
organisation of this kind to operate within the 
wider framework of governance in PNG.6
Accumulation of new responsibilities
When the PDA was first established in 1989, 
its primary functions were understood to be the 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure 
on behalf of the three tiers of government. By 1998 
it had acquired additional responsibilities, and 
the order in which it acquired them is reflected in 
the list of functions assigned to the new SPA in 
the Memorandum of Agreement. By 2002 it had 
taken on other functions which are not included 
in this list. For example, some Porgerans had paid 
Telikom for phone connections. Telikom had 
bought the necessary equipment, and should have 
installed it under the terms of the original mining 
development agreements, but said that it could 
not pay the extra cost of installation. The PDA 
therefore decided to foot the bill. Likewise, when 
Elcom (now PNG Power) cut off power supplies 
to Paiam town and the Porgera hospital, and 
local people began to chop down the power lines 
in protest, the PDA had to buy a transformer to 
maintain the power supply to the hospital, thus 
enlarging the scope of its responsibility for that 
institution. By 2002, the PDA was also covering 
the entire cost of police operations in Porgera 
District apart from the salaries and uniforms of 
the policemen.
While the PDA had no legal mandate for 
the performance of functions not listed in the 
Memorandum of Agreement, the managers were 
acting to address the demands of the local 
community in order to take the heat off the 
mining company, which might otherwise be held 
responsible for the failure of other government 
agencies to meet their obligations. It is therefore 
interesting to note that the company and 
community representatives on the PDA Board 
were inclined to support a further extension 
of its responsibilities, while the government 
representatives stood out for their regular absence 
from board meetings. This might help to explain 
why the PDA had not been able to connect its 
local projects to sectoral development strategies 
which ought to have been the responsibility of 
other government agencies, or to devise its own 
strategic planning framework.
Relationship with district administration
Prior to the passage of the new Organic Law 
in 1995, Porgera District was the area covered 
by the two local government councils whose 
functions were partly transferred to the PDA 
in 1989. By aligning ‘district’ boundaries with 
those of open electorates, the new Organic Law 
incorporated the old Porgera District into a new 
Porgera-Lagaip District which had a considerably 
larger population. This point seems to have 
escaped the notice of the people who drafted the 
Memorandum of Agreement which established 
the new SPA in 1998, but it almost certainly 
set the PDA on a collision course with the 
national MP and the administrator of the new 
district. In fact, the first administrator of the 
Porgera-Lagaip District previously had been the 
administrator of the old Porgera District, and 
was quite supportive of the PDA, but the MP 
engineered his removal in 2000. The MP was 
keen to use the PDA as a vehicle to implement 
his own projects in those parts of his electorate 
where his political supporters were concentrated, 
but the community representatives on the PDA 
Board were able to protect the organisation from 
this kind of political interference by insisting on 
the geographical limits of its original mandate.
According to the Organic Law, the PDA 
should still have exercised its functions in a 
manner consistent with the priorities established 
by the Joint District Planning and Budget 
Priorities Committee. However, in the first five 
years of its existence, the only priority established 
by the Porgera-Lagaip JDPBPC consisted of a 
1999 declaration that 60 percent of district 
revenues should be spent on roads. In the absence 
of a District Development Plan, the PDA set 
its own priorities through an annual process of 
consultation with local communities in the old 
Porgera District.
Although the MP and the new District 
Administrator resented the relative autonomy 
of the PDA, and were opposed to any further 
extension of its mandate, the PDA Board still 
agreed to allocate one-third of the PDA’s budget 
to the district administration. This was justified 
by their unwillingness to take responsibility for 
the welfare of people in the Lagaip section of the 
Porgera-Lagaip District, whose population is still 
larger than that of the old Porgera District. By 
2002, however, the PDA Board was demanding 
an end to this subsidy because of growing 
evidence of its abuse by the staff of the district 
administration.
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PDA Board to exercise some control over the 
way the money was spent, rather than rely on 
the national government to assess the merit of 
project proposals submitted by the company.
Nevertheless, PDA managers felt that they 
were losing out on this arrangement. This was 
partly because the mining company was still 
charging (and hence retaining) the full value 
of the management fees included in the project 
costings, and partly because it was liable to 
delay reimbursement of the balance until it had 
provided evidence of project completion to the 
Internal Revenue Commission. In effect, this 
meant that the PDA was obliged to make the 
initial project investment without any guarantee 
of cost recovery. Furthermore, it was difficult 
for the PDA to plan for its own involvement 
in the implementation of tax credit projects, 
because the future value of tax credits would be 
a function of the company’s operating profit, and 
the company was adopting a fairly conservative 
approach to its own profit forecasts. 
Demonstration of ﬁnancial transparency
The PDA was hampered in its efforts to 
secure funding from sources other than the 
government by the Auditor-General’s insistence 
on his own power to determine who should audit 
the books of any government agency. According 
to PDA management, the then Auditor-General 
(who has since been relieved of his position) had 
required that a substantial advance be paid to his 
own office before being passed on to a local firm 
of business consultants with whom he had a close 
working relationship. Unfortunately, this did not 
have the effect of producing an audit, and the 
PDA was left to petition the Auditor-General for 
return of the down payment.
In the meantime, the lack of audited accounts 
was jeopardising the PDA’s application to the 
Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) Incentive Fund, and was no doubt 
becoming a matter of concern for other donor 
agencies. However, the PDA’s managers may 
have been wrong to assume that the Auditor-
General would be able to invalidate an audit 
undertaken by a reputable company which had 
not been appointed at his own discretion.7
Management of landowner beneﬁts
Although the landowner representatives 
on the PDA’s Board had proven to be ardent 
defenders of the organisation’s independence, 
and generally supported the appointment of 
expatriates to manage its affairs, this did nothing 
to simplify the task of managing the actual 
distribution of landowner benefits. 
Uncertain cash ﬂows from national 
government
By 2002 the PDA was facing an imminent 
cash flow crisis because of a combination of 
factors beyond the control of its managers:
•  The funding commitments contained in 
the original mining development agreements 
failed to take account of the high rate of inflation 
which followed the devaluation of the national 
currency in the second half of the 1990s. This 
meant, for example, that the PDA was saddled 
with a commitment to build the same number of 
houses each year, even though the cost of each 
house had more than doubled.
•  The national government had reneged on 
some of its own commitments under the original 
mining development agreements because it had 
to deal with its own cash flow crisis. For example, 
it had ceased funding the salaries of the PDA’s 
manager, accountant and engineer as a separate 
budget item, and there was an annual shortfall 
of K700,000 in its contribution to the cost of 
running the Porgera District Hospital.
•  Under the terms of the Organic Law, the 
funding which was still allocated to the PDA 
in the national budget had to pass through the 
Provincial Treasury on its way from the National 
Treasury. PDA management was convinced that 
some of this money was being diverted in the 
process. Provincial government staff had generally 
been less than helpful in pressing the PDA’s 
claims on the national budget because they felt 
(with some reason) that Porgera was already far 
better off than the rest of Enga Province.
Aside from these problems, the PDA’s revenue 
base was set to shrink with the approaching 
closure of the mine. The mine’s annual output 
and profits were already beginning to decline, and 
nearly all of the PDA’s income was dependent on 
one or other of these two variables. It was 
therefore doubtful whether the PDA would be 
able to keep performing its mandated functions 
through to the point of mine closure, let alone 
beyond that point.
Management of the Tax Credit Scheme
The PDA had assumed responsibility for 
the planning, design and implementation of 
some of the infrastructure projects for which 
the mining company was claiming a tax credit 
from the Internal Revenue Commission. This 
was consistent with the PDA’s mandate to 
implement infrastructure projects on behalf of 
the government because money spent under 
the Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme was really 
government money. It could also be explained by 
the desire of community representatives on the 
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For example, there had been a steady increase 
in the number of ‘landowners’ claiming a share 
of the royalties allocated to them under the 
mining development agreements. Each of the 23 
‘clan agents’ who represented the landowning 
community had a good deal of discretion to 
add extra spouses, relatives and dependants to 
the list of ‘clan members’. This meant that the 
landowners were continually grumbling about the 
decline in the value of their royalty cheques, and 
they were sometimes inclined to suspect that part 
of their entitlement had been misappropriated.
If the PDA management therefore had to 
manage complaints about the distribution of 
royalties, it is not surprising that they sought to 
avoid any further engagement in debate about 
that portion of the royalty (about one-third of 
the total allocated to the landowners) which had 
been placed in trust for future generations since 
the start of mining operations.8 Some landowners 
had been using the money in the so-called 
‘Children Trust’ to pay for their children to attend 
international schools in Port Moresby, or even in 
Australia. As the number of eligible children 
continued to grow, this practice threatened 
to exhaust the trust fund before the point of 
mine closure. The trustees had to persuade the 
landowners to limit the payment of primary 
school fees to the cost of attending the Porgera 
International School, which was then upgraded 
to accommodate the expanded roll. Although an 
SPA could in theory assume responsibility for the 
establishment and management of trust funds, 
the PDA did not have a mandate to deal with 
the future effects of mine closure, and there was 
no guarantee that it would still exist once the 
mine closed. 
TURNING ANOMALIES INTO POLICY
Whatever its powers, responsibilities, 
capacities or deficiencies, the PDA was still 
an exceptional institution, and Part VII of the 
Local-level Governments Administration Act 
was still a legal anomaly within the framework 
of the Organic Law. On the other hand, the 
terms of reference set for myself and the other 
consultants engaged to produce a sustainable 
development policy for the PNG mining sector 
made it clear that this policy would have to 
specify an institutional mechanism for the 
effective management of benefits allocated to 
landowners and project area communities as a 
result of mining development agreements (PNG 
Department of Mining, 2003). Furthermore, this 
mechanism would have to last throughout and 
beyond the life of a large-scale mining operation 
in order to produce sustainable development 
outcomes for these local beneficiaries. 
In our view, there was no way that LLGs 
could be expected to perform this function. This 
was partly because of the legal restrictions placed 
on their capacity to recruit and reward the staff 
required to manage a budget far in excess of that 
normally available to an LLG, and partly because 
the current structures of governance could 
not protect a budget of this size from political 
manipulation and misappropriation, even if the 
local staff were competent and honest. Our view 
was shared by most of the other stakeholders 
in the mining sector – not least by the people 
of Porgera – but was initially resisted by staff of 
the Department of National Planning and Rural 
Development (DNPRD). Their resistance was 
based on three considerations:
•  they had a vested interest in the creation 
of a uniform system of planning and budgeting 
within the framework of the Organic Law;
•  they resented the size of the benefit packages 
which local landowners were able to extract from 
the government by way of ‘compensation’ for the 
process of development; and
•  they thought that ‘sustainable development’ 
was their business, and not that of the Department 
of Mining. 
One of the key points at issue here was the 
Tax Credit Scheme. The Department of Mining 
had formerly been the national government 
agency responsible for the approval of tax credit 
projects proposed by mining companies, but the 
DNPRD had managed to take this responsibility 
away from them on the grounds that tax credit 
projects should be consistent with the provincial 
and district plans approved by the national 
planning agency. On the other hand, DNPRD 
staff were not happy with the Tax Credit Scheme 
itself, because they thought it was an institution 
invented by the mining industry, aided and 
abetted by the Department of Mining, which 
had the effect of making mining companies 
responsible for some of the functions of local and 
provincial governments. If mining companies 
were only going to perform these functions for as 
long as their mines were operational, the scheme 
was an obstacle to the ‘sustainable development’ 
of provincial and local government capacity.
We could not defeat this argument by citing 
the PDA as an example of the role which a local 
government institution could play in the design 
and management of tax credit projects. In this 
respect, the PDA was simply acting as one of 
the mining company’s engineering contractors; 
the PDA was not building local government 
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capacity but substituting for its absence, and 
the PDA’s own capacities did not appear to be 
sustainable beyond the point of mine closure. 
In any case, the Porgera Joint Venture had 
been the mining company which persuaded the 
national government to introduce the Tax Credit 
Scheme in the first place. Even the staff of the 
Department of Mining would agree that this 
scheme currently made no provision for the 
maintenance of local infrastructure after mine 
closure, and its role in the formulation of a mine 
closure policy or sustainable development policy 
was therefore problematic.
Our problem, in essence, was to connect the 
Tax Credit Scheme with SPAs and LLGs in a way 
that would be equally acceptable to both national 
government departments, as well as to the other 
stakeholders in the mining sector. This meant 
showing how the new connection would serve 
to reduce the dependency of local communities 
and institutions on mining company expertise 
over the course of the mining project cycle, and 
how it would help them to survive the social 
and economic impact of mine closure. At the 
same time, we had to minimise, and if possible 
eliminate, the need for any further amendments 
to the Organic Law, even though some of its 
provisions – especially those in Section 98 – had 
been a major bone of contention in the mining 
sector for several years. 
The way in which we solved this problem was 
to propose a ‘Tax Credit Conversion Scheme’ 
through which:
•  tax credit expenditures by a mining 
company within its immediate area of impact 
should from the outset be made in accordance 
with a Community Sustainable Development 
Plan, and should normally be managed under a 
contractual relationship between the company 
and an SPA; but
•  this kind of expenditure should be 
progressively converted into tax-creditable 
‘development levies’ during the operational 
life of the mine, which should then constitute 
an increasing proportion of the Project Area 
Development Fund which the SPA itself spends 
on the implementation of the same plan.
We then went on to suggest that the 
conversion of tax credits into development levies 
should be accompanied by a parallel transfer of 
responsibility from the company to the SPA for 
building the capacity of other local institutions 
(including LLGs) to manage the continued 
implementation of the Community Sustainable 
Development Plan beyond the point of mine 
closure, when the SPA’s own responsibilities 
should be confined to the management of a trust 
fund established to maintain the public goods and 
services already financed by mineral revenues.
The mining industry had initially opposed 
Section 98 of the Organic Law because it appeared 
to foreshadow the imposition of ‘development 
levies’ as a new form of tax on new mining projects. 
The trouble is that Section 98 requires a resource 
developer to pay development levies to one or 
more provincial and local-level governments ‘out 
of its own cost’, and the amendment of this 
phrase would seem to be the one and only 
amendment required by our proposal for a Tax 
Credit Conversion Scheme. Our proposal was 
designed to take advantage of the fact that 
Section 98 allows for development levies to be 
paid directly to LLGs or their instrumentalities, 
without first passing through the national or 
provincial treasury. Section 98 also says two 
more things about development levies which 
could be taken to deal with issues raised either 
by the Porgera Development Authority or by the 
National Planning Department: it provides for 
the establishment of trust funds (under separate 
legislation) in order to protect these revenues from 
political manipulation; and it places an obligation 
on developers to provide professional advice to 
the recipients on the manner of their use.
It would have been foolish to build an entire 
policy and planning framework on a single minor 
amendment to the Organic Law when there is 
no guarantee that this will find its way through 
the national parliament. Nor was there any 
reason for us to assume that the Internal Revenue 
Commission would see the sense of the Tax 
Credit Conversion Scheme, especially when the 
Department of Mining had generally failed in 
its attempts to modify the existing scheme. But 
this specific proposal was not essential to the 
process of institutionalising the role of SPAs 
within a new policy and planning framework 
for the mining sector, because the planning 
and management functions associated with a 
Project Area Development Fund are not entirely 
dependent on its actual sources of revenue. What 
is primarily required for the purpose of achieving 
sustainable development outcomes for local 
communities is a revenue stream of predictable 
size, and for which there is some promise of 
continuity past the point of mine closure.9
A more problematic issue for a policy which 
sets out a preference for one way of managing a 
Project Area Development Fund is the variety of 
institutional arrangements which have already 
been adopted  for different mining projects. Such 
arrangements might continue to be justified by 
the variety of local circumstances in which such 
projects are established. Even if it is agreed that 
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institution to perform these functions or, if there 
is a space and a need, that the area in question is 
too large to be covered by a single SPA. 
In 2001, Ok Tedi Mining Ltd (OTML) 
established the Ok Tedi Development Foundation 
as a vehicle for the delivery of a range of public 
goods and services which are not unlike those 
delivered by the Porgera Development Authority 
(Table 3). In 2002, BHP-Billiton transferred its 
52 percent share of OTML to PNG Sustainable 
Development Ltd (more commonly known as the 
‘Sustainable Development Program Company’), 
which is committed to invest all its revenues 
from the mining operation in the creation of a 
perpetual trust fund that will be used to finance 
sustainable development projects in Western 
Province and the rest of PNG. However, neither 
of these entities is a recipient of any government 
revenues apart from those withheld under the 
Tax Credit Scheme, and neither of them has 
any legal control over the revenues which the 
national government transfers to provincial 
and local-level governments under the mining 
development agreements.
The misappropriation and mismanagement 
of mine-related revenues by the Fly River 
Provincial Government (FRPG) has been 
a matter of growing concern since the mine 
became operational in 1984 (Little and Regan 
1987; Burton 1998; Finlayson 2002). Although 
the agreements covering the distribution of these 
revenues require that a certain proportion be 
spent on public goods and services in the mine-
affected area, they do not actually stipulate 
the Porgera Development Authority represents 
the best deal for Porgera, why should we assume 
that this kind of institution is necessary or 
desirable in other contexts? And what case 
could be made for the establishment of an SPA 
in areas affected by existing mines which are 
already operating under agreements that do not 
countenance the need for such an institution?
In the case of the Misima mine, it is certainly 
too late to establish an SPA because the mine 
is about to close and the Louisiade LLG is not 
due to receive any mine-related revenues after 
this happens. In the Lihir case, on the other 
hand, the Nimamar LLG is due to receive 
revenues for several decades. Furthermore, as we 
have seen, this LLG was actually born out of a 
Development Authority established under the 
previous Organic Law at the insistence of the 
local community. Although the Lihirians failed 
to follow the Porgeran example by insisting on 
its transformation into an SPA as soon as the 
new Organic Law came into effect, they have 
since realised that the LLG does not have the 
capacity to manage the revenues from the mining 
development agreements. 
The Ok Tedi case is rather more complex. 
In this case, the ‘mine-affected area’ is now 
understood to include all or part of four different 
districts in two different provinces,10 and the 
mining company has taken on more of the 
normal functions of provincial and local-level 
governments than any other private company in 
PNG. It might therefore be argued that there is 
no space or no need for the creation of another 
Table 3: Goal, purpose and component objectives of the Ok Tedi Development Foundation.
Goal
To promote equitable and sustainable social and economic development in the 
Western Province.
Purpose
To provide targeted support for livelihood development, community and 
government expenditure planning and priority infrastructure development.
Component 1:
Development Planning: To support community and government planning initiatives 
for sustainable and equitable social and economic development.
Component 2:
Rural and Economic Development: To improve food security and increase economic 
independence of communities through growth of the non-mine related economy. 
Component 3:
Infrastructure Development: To facilitate the construction and maintenance of 
priority government and community infrastructure. 
Component 4:
Administration: To establish procedures, systems and plans for the organisation and 
management of the Foundation. 
Source: Simpson (2002).
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any transfers to the relevant LLGs, and this 
tier of government would almost certainly have 
withered away if it had not been subsidised and 
supported directly by the mining company. 
In 2000, when the FRPG was in one if its 
periodic states of suspension, the mining company 
was able to persuade the national government 
to establish a ‘Western Province Capacity 
Building Project’ (WPCBP) whose staff would be 
directly accountable to a committee comprising 
representatives of several national government 
agencies, as well as OTML and the FRPG. This 
institution was to be funded through direct transfers 
of a 25 percent share of the mining royalties and 
Special Support Grant that would otherwise have 
been subsumed in the provincial budget, while 
its management and technical support costs were 
also meant to be covered by the government. By 
2002, it was already evident that the national 
government could not or would not meet its own 
commitments, so the project’s funding was limited 
to the royalty stream which came directly from 
OTML. The mining company was also covering 
the project’s management and technical support, 
but was threatening to end this subsidy unless the 
national government abandoned the practice of 
placing all of its own contributions in the black 
hole otherwise known as the Provincial Operating 
Account (Simpson 2002). 
Insofar as the Western Province Capacity 
Building Project had a remit to build local, as 
well as provincial, government capacity, and 
even to carry out some of the LLG functions set 
down in the Organic Law, it is an institution 
which could partly be substituted by an SPA, 
or by several SPAs covering different parts of 
the mine-affected area, if the distribution and 
disbursement of government revenues could be 
subjected to a modicum of common sense. From 
a strictly legal point of view, the WPCBP is 
even more of an anomaly than the Porgera 
Development Authority, and this might explain 
why the national government has treated it 
as another tentacle of OTML. But the PDA 
has also fallen foul of Treasury’s insistence that 
all public funding of LLG functions must pass 
through provincial government accounts which 
are more or less unaccountable. In this respect, 
Western Province is the nation’s basket case, 
but if nothing is done to create a viable form of 
local government in that province, it is hard to 
see how the Sustainable Development Program 
Company will get value for the very large amount 
of money which it has to spend there.
Even if a new mineral policy framework were 
to facilitate the establishment of SPAs in parts 
of Western Province, it should still recognise 
cases in which this would not be an appropriate 
way of dealing with the management of mineral 
revenues at a local scale.
•  An SPA would not be warranted without 
an agreement to spend a certain proportion 
of the government’s mineral revenues on the 
population of a mine-affected area for a certain 
period of time – say ten, fifteen, or even twenty 
years. This means that the scale and duration of 
a mining project have to be taken into account 
in the development planning process.
•  Even where a large-scale mining project is 
set to generate substantial revenues for a lengthy 
period, there might already be an agreement 
to establish an institution which has functions, 
powers or responsibilities like those of an SPA 
without actually being one. In the case of the 
Ramu nickel-cobalt mine, which has yet to be 
developed, there is already an agreement to set 
up a ‘Ramu Foundation’ which (unlike the Ok 
Tedi Development Foundation) is an institution 
of this type.
•  It is hard to see how an SPA could be 
created against the wishes of the local-level 
government(s) or the population it is meant to 
serve. As we have seen, the relative success of 
the PDA has partly been a function of the level 
of community support which it enjoys.
•  Finally, it is possible that the district 
administration(s) and LLG(s) responsible for the 
mine-affected area have already demonstrated 
a capacity to manage the benefits derived from 
mining projects, even if their scale and duration 
might otherwise appear to warrant to creation of 
an SPA.
The capacity of an SPA to perform the 
functions of an LLG would clearly be enhanced 
by the establishment of a policy framework 
which establishes the conditions in which 
this substitution is warranted. But the policy 
which sets out these conditions also needs to be 
accompanied by the development of guidelines 
for the operation and management of SPAs 
which go beyond the legal requirements of the 
Local-level Governments Administration Act. 
In the case of the mining sector, these guidelines 
would need to deal specifically with the role 
of SPAs in implementation of the Tax Credit 
Scheme and in the management of any trust 
funds established as forms of insurance against 
the negative impacts of mine closure.
INTER-SECTORAL POLICY 
TRANSFER
To the best of my knowledge, no serious 
consideration has yet been given to the possible 
incorporation of SPAs into any sectoral policy 
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Box 1: The Kutubu Special Purposes Authorities controversy.
K1 MILLION IN “ILLEGAL” ACCOUNT
‘A senior politician from the Southern Highlands province is under investigations for the 
depositing of more than K1 million in Kutubu funds into an “illegal” account. Koroba/Kopiago MP 
Petrus Thomas revealed this in Parliament yesterday, saying such practice has deprived the province 
of development, and left its capital Mendi looking like a ghost town.
‘Mr Thomas alleged during Question Time that two cheques worth more than K1 million for 
the Kutubu Special Project [sic] Authority (KSPA) were deposited into an illegal account and 
withdrawn the same day for unknown reasons. He said that a first secretary to a senior MP from the 
province collected and deposited cheque number 774991 for the sum of K592,200 from the Finance 
Department. The money intended for the KSPA was then deposited into an illegal account with 
ANZ on April 1 and cleared the same day. He also said another cheque, number 1482 for the sum of 
K500,000 from Mineral Resource Development Company for KSPA, was also collected by the said 
leader and deposited into the same ANZ account on April 8 and drawn down the same day…
‘The first-term MP asked what the government would do regarding the leader involved in such 
practises. In response, Inter Government Affairs Minister Sir Peter Barter admitted that he was 
made aware that the money was collected by a member of the government and paid into the illegal 
account … He said he has ordered an investigation into the two cheques totalling K1,092,200 
for the KSPA that was deposited into an ANZ account bank and not the legal account held with 
BSP.… He said they would wait for an explanation from the bank before taking any further action’ 
(The National, 13 May 2004). 
YAWARI DENIES K1 MILLION CLAIM
‘SOUTHERN Highlands Governor Hami Yawari denied claims that more than K1 million 
belonging to the Kutubu Special Purpose Authority was deposited into an illegal account. He said 
this in response to a front page article in The National Newspaper yesterday in which Koroba 
Kopiago MP Petrus Thomas said two cheques were deposited into an illegal account with the ANZ 
bank rather the legal KSPA account with Bank South Pacific.
‘He said there was no illegal account with ANZ bank as claimed. The account belongs to KSPA, 
which is held by Thomas Kapi. Mr Yawari explained that under his government, he recognises Mr 
Kapi as the legitimate KSPA chairman and he deposited the two cheques into the ANZ account. 
He also said the reports indicating that money came out the same day was wrong because Moses 
Kosi, who claims to be chairman of KSPA, holds another account with BSP. He said the provincial 
government does not recognise Mr Kosi as chairman because his election was not properly 
scrutinised.
‘“We (provincial government) release 30% of Special Support Grant (SSG) to KSPA. The 
member for Koroba-Kopiago should have come to me and cross-check the facts before going public. 
He (Mr Thomas) also got his information wrong. No money came from the Finance and Treasury 
Department or MRDC, the money came from the provincial government,” said Mr Yawari.
‘He also said the money was not withdrawn on the same day as claimed because there was a 
court order restraining withdrawal of the money. Mr Yawari said there would be a court hearing 
today (Friday) to determine the legal chairman of KSPA. He said the provincial government would 
not release any money into the two accounts until the court determines the legitimate chairman 
and accounts. Mr Yawari said he does not want to interfere in the case until the court determines 
the outcome.
‘Meanwhile, Member for Nipa Kutubu Robert Kopaol, whose electorate covers the Kutubu Special 
Purpose Authority, said last night that his concern was over the legitimacy of the appointments and 
accountability of the funds. “I, as the custodian of the electorate, will do everything to get to the 
bottom of this,” he said’ (The National, 14 May 2004).
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framework outside of the mining sector. Even 
in the oil and gas sector, proposals for their 
establishment have been viewed with indifference 
or suspicion by the Department of Petroleum and 
Energy, despite the fact that the Oil and Gas 
Act 1998 makes detailed provision for revenues 
to be shared with local-level governments. The 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Affairs has also found fault with these proposals 
(Table 1), and a recent newspaper story suggests 
that it had good cause for concern (see Box 1). 
If it is generally agreed that LLGs or other local-
level institutions do not have the capacity to 
prevent this kind of misappropriation, the answer 
may be to improve the process through which 
the proposals are formulated in the first place 
and then to embed the institutions in a policy 
framework which imposes further controls on 
their operation.
These two sectors are themselves exceptional 
in the value of the benefit packages which large-
scale mining and petroleum projects are expected, 
or obliged, to bestow on local communities. Yet 
there are two other sectors which have the 
capacity to generate the sort of income streams 
which might warrant the establishment of an 
SPA in some circumstances: the forestry and 
conservation sectors. The forestry sector resembles 
the mining and petroleum sectors by virtue of the 
fact that large-scale logging projects are also 
expected to ‘compensate’ local communities for 
the extraction of a natural resource over a fixed 
period of time. The conservation sector, on the 
other hand, is one in which local communities 
could be granted a substantial benefit package 
in return for their agreement to refuse the form 
of ‘development’ offered by extractive industry 
for a much longer period of time. It can even 
be argued that SPAs are potentially more useful 
as instruments for the management of protected 
areas under customary ownership than they are 
as instruments for the management of revenues 
derived from the extraction of natural resources.
The Forestry Act 1992 foreshadowed the 
introduction of a new forest revenue system, but 
this was only finalised in 1996, one year after the 
new Organic Law had come into effect. In order to 
comply with Section 98, the new revenue system 
required the developer of a new logging operation to 
pay a Project Development Levy at a rate that varied 
with the log export price but tended to average K13 
per cubic metre. Forty percent of this levy was to 
be paid in cash to all the customary landowners 
in a timber concession, while the remainder was 
to be paid into a Project Area Development Fund 
for the purpose of providing social and economic 
infrastructure to local communities. The intention 
was to spread the benefits of logging beyond the 
area actually being logged in any particular year, 
because the customary owners of that area would 
already be receiving a royalty of at least K10 per 
cubic metre for the timber harvested from their 
land (Filer 1998: 211).
At no time does anyone seem to have considered 
placing each Project Area Development Fund 
under the management of an SPA. It was simply 
envisaged that each would be controlled by a 
‘Project Development Committee’ comprising 
representatives of the logging company, the 
landowning communities, the relevant provincial 
government, and the PNG Forest Authority.11 
It is hard to see how this kind of body could 
fulfil its stated purpose in the absence of any 
executive capacity, but the question has not 
been put to the test of practice, primarily because 
the World Bank has contrived to prevent the 
national government from granting new timber 
concessions. Even without this restriction, there 
are presently few areas with commercial forestry 
potential where a single concession is likely to 
yield a sufficient volume of timber for a sufficient 
period of time to warrant the management costs 
of an SPA set up to manage the Project Area 
Development Fund. And even where the revenue 
stream might be adequate for this purpose, the 
Forestry Act does not currently provide for a 
process of consultation with local communities 
and local-level governments which is likely to 
lead to an agreement on the need to establish 
such a body.12 
The Forestry Act prescribes a process of 
‘resource acquisition’ by which the PNG Forest 
Authority must enter into a Forest Management 
Agreement with incorporated groups of customary 
landowners before it can grant a timber concession 
to a logging company. The legal and bureaucratic 
complexities of this process have created the 
political space for conservation organisations to go 
even further than the World Bank in challenging 
the government’s capacity and authority to create 
new ‘forest production areas’. From time to time, 
they have also considered using this same process 
as a vehicle for the creation of ‘forest protection 
areas’ by offering to compensate the government 
and the landowners for the opportunity costs of 
conservation (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
But this does not seem to be a viable method of 
creating protected areas, firstly because of the 
same legal and bureaucratic complexities which 
the conservationists can otherwise use to achieve 
conservation by default, and secondly because 
the Forestry Act assumes that timber concessions 
will only be granted for a limited period of time. 
There would have been no need for 
conservationists to consider this option if the 
Conservation Areas Act 1978 had been brought 
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into effect. But the Department of Environment 
and Conservation has not yet been able to 
mobilise the financial and institutional resources 
for this to happen, and the new Organic Law has 
only complicated the matter by devolving some 
of the Department’s powers and responsibilities 
to lower levels of government. In the meantime, 
the only other legal instrument available for 
the creation of protected areas on customary 
land is the Fauna (Protection and Control) Act 
1966, which enables landowning communities 
to establish Wildlife Management Areas and 
form Wildlife Management Committees to make 
rules about the hunting of birds and animals 
within these areas (Eaton 1997). Most of the 
areas protected in this way are very small in size, 
and the Fauna Act does nothing to prevent their 
customary owners from choosing to ‘develop’ the 
land or to have it ‘developed’ by a third party.
There are some third parties in the 
conservation industry who would be willing to 
pay large amounts of money for the establishment 
and maintenance of larger protected areas on 
customary land if there were legal guarantees 
against their subsequent conversion. Transnational 
NGOs like Conservation International and 
The Nature Conservancy are able to purchase 
protected areas from the governments of 
developing countries when the areas in question 
are legally defined as state property. But this 
cannot be done in a country where more than 
98 percent of the land and most of the inshore 
marine resources are under customary ownership. 
Conservationists have therefore thought long 
and hard about how to create an enduring 
contract or covenant between government and 
the customary owners of a protected area, and how 
to persuade adjacent communities to participate 
in this arrangement. However, for all the talk of 
integrating conservation with development, or 
of exchanging offers of development for promises 
of conservation, they have largely neglected 
the question of how to deliver public goods and 
services to the landowners in return for their 
cooperation. The reason why local landowners 
will commonly express a preference for the kind 
of ‘development’ offered by extractive industry 
is that this does involve the promise of roads, 
schools and health facilities – which are not the 
sort of thing that conservation organisations are 
able to deliver on their own account.
Conservation organisations are aware that 
Section 44 of the Organic Law allows LLGs to pass 
laws about the ‘local environment’, subject to the 
approval of the Minister for Intergovernmental 
Affairs. The Nature Conservancy has even helped 
some LLGs in Madang Province to draft this 
kind of legislation (Post Courier, 28 May 2003). 
However, no one seems to have considered using 
SPAs as a mechanism for the implementation of 
such laws, for the management of protected areas, 
or for the delivery of public goods and services to 
landowners who agree to their establishment.
The Kokoda Track Authority (KTA) is the 
only SPA under consideration by the Department 
of Provincial and Local Government Affairs 
which appears to have an environmental 
protection function (see Table 1). The proposal 
to establish this body was primarily motivated 
by the interest of local tour operators after the 
landowners threatened to close the track to foreign 
tourists in the wake of the Olympic torch relay in 
2000. The idea was supported by the Australian 
High Commission, which paid for a lawyer to 
produce a draft constitution, and the Head of 
State finally proclaimed its establishment in June 
2003. However, the KTA is not yet operational 
because of debates about the composition of its 
managing body, and especially about the best way 
to secure genuine landowner representation and 
participation. In the meantime, tour guides have 
been charging K200 for each of the tourists who 
hike across the track with a view to placing this 
money (now totalling almost K100,000) at the 
disposal of the KTA once it is proclaimed (Paul 
Chatterton, personal communication, May 2004). 
The creation of an SPA in the conservation 
sector cannot serve to modify the ownership of 
land or other natural resources any more than the 
creation of an SPA in the mining sector can serve 
to change the nature of a Special Mining Lease. 
However, once we recognise the distinction 
between institutions which deliver benefits to 
local landowners and institutions which deliver 
transformation in the ownership of land, we 
might be able to adopt a more creative approach 
to the business of combining these institutions 
within the existing legal and policy framework. 
For example, the oil palm industry – which is not 
normally treated as a source of inspiration by the 
conservation industry – has been using the so-
called ‘lease-leaseback’ provisions of the Land Act 
to create miniature oil palm estates on customary 
land in partnership with the local landowners, 
and the same mechanism has been proposed as a 
way of creating and managing forest plantations 
on customary land (Oliver 2002). Commercial 
plantations can provide material benefits for 
their customary owners which are sufficient to 
compensate for the limitations thus imposed on 
the use of their land, without the need to make 
special arrangements for the delivery of public 
goods and services as well. Experience suggests 
that the type of ‘eco-enterprise’ promoted by 
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conservation organisations will often, if not always, 
fail to yield a reliable flow of material rewards for 
a lengthy period of time. If there is a way to cover 
this risk by funding an increased flow of public 
goods and services, then this avenue needs to 
be explored. And since the government has to 
be involved in any form of tenure conversion, 
because of the nature of PNG’s landed property 
regime, the proponents of protected areas should 
take advantage of all existing legal instruments 
which can assist their cause.
CONCLUSION
I do not wish to suggest that a Special 
Purposes Authority is a ‘magic bullet’ to be fired 
at any situation where local communities stand to 
receive an unusually large package of public goods 
and services from agreements to exploit, manage 
or conserve their natural resources. Anyone who 
has recently visited the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government Affairs in PNG will 
know that it is a mere shadow of the once mighty 
Department of District Administration, and that 
its capacity to manage the establishment of more 
SPAs must certainly be questioned. The story of 
the Kutubu SPA (Box 1) brings into question its 
capacity to prevent the abuse of such institutional 
arrangements. Of course, the search for a hole-
proof institution in PNG is a task best left to a 
knight in shining armour. However, if problems 
are still appearing when the Minister for Inter-
Governmental Affairs is a man widely respected 
for his personal integrity and dedication to the 
principles of good governance, one wonders 
what might happen if he were to be succeeded 
by a minister without these qualities. Part VII 
of the Local-level Governments Administration 
Act appears to grant a rather alarming degree of 
discretion to the occupant of this position.
I suggest that the best way to defend such 
institutional arrangements is to specify the 
conditions of their use within specific sectoral 
policy frameworks. This could still be problematic 
because some central government agencies – most 
notably the Department of National Planning 
and Rural Development – are suspicious of any 
arrangements which might seem to bypass the 
standard provisions of the new Organic Law. The 
best way to get around this problem is to show 
that there are some policy domains in which SPAs 
may be promoted and supported, and not merely 
tolerated, as instruments for the achievement of 
sustainable development outcomes, and that this 
can be done without violating the spirit or letter 
of the Organic Law.
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ENDNOTES
1 The author would like to thank Paul Chatterton, Ron 
May and Kathy Whimp for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.
2 Elections for membership of 284 rural and urban 
LLGs constituted under the new law were held after 
the 1997 national elections.
3 New Ireland was one of six provincial governments to 
legislate for the replacement of some or all of the old 
local government councils by smaller ‘community 
governments’, and it did so primarily to appease 
the Lihirian community after the feasibility of a 
large-scale mining operation was established during 
the 1980s. Five provincial governments (North 
Solomons, Milne Bay, East New Britain, Morobe and 
Manus) passed and implemented their Community 
Government Acts between 1978 and 1982, whereas 
New Ireland did not do so until 1988 (Ghai and 
Regan 1992: 417-424).
4 Under the old Organic Law, local government 
was treated as a subject of ‘primary provincial 
competence’, which meant that any ‘exhaustive’ 
provincial legislation relating to this subject 
would take precedence over any previous national 
legislation relating to the same subject. This meant 
that provincial governments also had the power 
to legislate for the creation of an SPA with all 
the powers and functions of a local or community 
government. The new Organic Law does not allow 
for an SPA to assume this full range of powers and 
functions.
5 In its current form, the Tax Credit Scheme allows 
the developers of large-scale mining and petroleum 
projects to spend up to 0.75 percent of their gross 
revenues on the construction of social and economic 
infrastructure, and to have this counted as corporate 
income tax already paid to the government.
6 Given that this discussion is primarily based on 
interviews with PDA management, it should be 
taken to illustrate the problems which SPA managers 
are liable to encounter in their dealings with the rest 
of the government system, rather than the problems 
which other government personnel might encounter 
in their dealings with an SPA. 
7 It is not clear how SPAs are subject to the ﬁnancial 
accountability framework established for provincial 
and local-level governments by the Public Finance 
Administration Act.
8 Under the original agreements, 23 percent of 
the mining royalties collected by the national 
government were to be repatriated to the local 
community – eight percent to the SML landowners, 
ﬁve percent to the PDA, and ten percent to the 
‘Porgera SML Landowners’ Children’s Investment 
Fund’ (Banks 1999: 105).
9 Where these revenues are tied to those of a speciﬁc 
mining operation, they are bound to ﬂuctuate from 
year to year because of variations in the mineral 
export price and the proﬁts of the operating company, 
but it should still be possible to adopt a conservative 
approach to revenue forecasting which allows for 
periodic windfalls to be set aside for future needs. 
10 The original Ok Tedi Agreement of 1976 gave ﬁrst 
preference in project employment and local business 
development to ‘the landowners in and other people 
originating from the Kiunga and Telefomin sub-
provinces’, which are now the North Fly District 
of Western Province and the adjoining Telefomin 
District of West Sepik Province. The Mining (Ok Tedi 
Mine Continuation [Ninth Supplemental] Agreement) 
Act 2001 deﬁnes recognises six ‘geographical areas 
impacted by the Project’, and these are distributed 
between the three districts of Western Province. 
11 A report to the PNG Forest Authority on 
‘representative resource owner bodies for forestry 
projects’ had recommended that these bodies 
should preferably be local-level governments, or 
else landowner associations established under the 
Associations Incorporation Act (Whimp 1995: 28). 
However, this report was completed before the 
introduction of the new revenue system.
12 The institution known as the ‘Development Forum’ 
was originally invented in 1988 to facilitate the 
development of the Porgera mine, and was then 
incorporated into Section 3 of the Mining Act 
as a process of consultation which the Minister 
is now obliged to undertake before the issue of a 
Special Mining Lease. This institution reappears in 
Section 116 of the new Organic Law as a process of 
consultation required for the large-scale development 
of any natural resources, but the Forestry Act has not 
yet been amended to meet this requirement.
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